Why did they suddenly cease the construction of the largest Egyptian monuments, since these were so important to the pharaohs and had consumed enormous resources and time? Traditional answers - "they ran out of resources" or "religion changed" - do not fully explain the full scope and consequences of this phenomenon. The present theory elaborates and strengthens the validity of an earlier concept - both proposed by Jacek Krzysztoń concerning the socio-economic function of the pyramids, showing that their eventual cessation was not due to failure or factors beyond the rulers` control, but rather to the success of achieving the intended goal.
The pyramids fulfilled their task: they integrated society, built the state, and jump-started its economy. Once that goal was achieved, the rulers did not rest on their laurels - they maintained the stability that had been attained and balanced the further development of the country by shifting to more flexible forms of public works projects, such as monumental temples. The author regards this change as a logical evolution of the tools of power and maintains the thesis that religion may have been a factor mobilising collective effort, rather than the primary reason for it. This reinterpretation shifts the emphasis from the afterlife to the here and now - and prompts a reconsideration of the role of the pyramids as a catalyst for the birth of the Egyptian state.
To understand why the rulers of Egypt after the era of Cheops gradually reduced the size of the pyramids, only to eventually abandon them completely, we must return to the question: why were pyramids built in the first place?
As the main socio-economic theory and the PaC model posit—where the process itself was the key, not the finished object—the pyramids were not just tombs. They were, above all, an active state-building tool. In the turbulent period after the unification of Upper and Lower Egypt, the pharaohs of the 4th Dynasty faced a fundamental challenge: how to truly integrate two different peoples, create a central administration from scratch, and stimulate an economy based on the redistribution of goods (payments in food). There could have been many reasons: growing conflicts and instability in the young state, excessive territorial dispersion, the need for cultural exchange, the necessity to organize a system for redistributing food surpluses, and also the creation of a safety buffer against potential natural disasters. It is worth noting a paradox here: the largest projects are often born not in times of plenty, but from the pressure of crisis. Just as the Apollo program was born from the fear of failure in the Cold War, the Great Pyramid could have been a radical response to the fundamental "integration crisis" of a young state.
Regardless of the exact causes, the answer became the pyramid—a gigantic, multi-generational public works project. It was a goal that forced cooperation, central planning, and the constant circulation of resources. Thus, the success of the project—and of the pharaohs themselves—lay not in the rapid completion of the monument, but in the very process of its prolonged construction, which integrated the nation through shared work.
Once the construction system was set in motion, it became a driving force in itself, practically the "economic backbone of the state." It created an extensive "network of dependencies"—entire economic branches and specialized groups of artisans, suppliers, logisticians, stonemasons, and administrators, including a vast bureaucracy. Thousands of people worked on these projects for their entire lives, and many of them left the agricultural cycle for new, artisanal professions or other permanent state project jobs.
After the completion of one monument, this powerful socio-economic apparatus could not simply stop and "go home." This would risk mass unemployment for specialists and the collapse of the structures the state had so carefully built. Therefore, the continuity of construction is one of the fundamental assumptions of PaC (Process as the Goal). The state needed a "new goal to maintain the system`s cohesion" and to "utilize the acquired skills" and accumulated resources. This machine could not be stopped.
Here, however, a fundamental problem arose. The old tool—the great pyramid—no longer suited the new conditions. Conditions that, paradoxically, had changed precisely because of the pyramids` success.
From an engineer`s perspective, a pyramid is a monolithic project, meaning it is a single, predefined solid. Its final shape, height, width, and angle of inclination are determined by the size of its base. This means the decision about the monument`s final size is made at the very beginning of the project and cannot be changed during construction. This is a fundamental difference compared to, for example, towers, whose height was often modified according to available funds or changing needs.
For a young state that needed to demonstrate strength, this risky "integration shock" was worth undertaking. However, for a state that had already achieved stability, it became an unnecessary burden and an excessive risk.
The PaC theory assumes that the pyramids achieved their intended goal and were a complete success. They fulfilled their mission. After decades of shared work, Egypt was integrated. The administration functioned efficiently, and society became wealthier and more stable.
This success fundamentally changed the social conditions. As the state matured, society became "richer and more civilized." The pressure to participate in gigantic physical labor decreased. Moreover, thousands of families gained permanent employment in the administration or other privileges, which reduced the availability (and desire) for mass physical labor. To put it bluntly: there began to be a shortage of hands for the heaviest work. Perhaps the spirit of the times also changed: the fascination with sheer mass and brutal size gave way to other, more refined forms of expressing majesty.
Pharaohs, as pragmatic managers, faced a new challenge: how to maintain work continuity for specialized cadres and uphold their authority, without having such a huge and massive workforce at their disposal, ready for another titanic effort?
Initially, they tried to adapt the old tool by building smaller pyramids (like those of Khafre and Menkaure). This was the first, intuitive attempt at adaptation and optimization. However, it proved insufficient because the tool was still rigid and risky. This forced rulers to seek radically new, truly flexible solutions.
The first evolution was a change in technology to subtractive work (removing material) instead of additive (adding material). A perfect example here is Abu Simbel.
This division allowed for more efficient use of the available workforce—engaging a smaller number of expensive specialists where they were essential, while using the majority of the workforce for simpler tasks. This completely changed the logic of personnel management.
This was the brilliant and final solution that dominated later dynasties. Examples here are Karnak and Luxor—masterpieces of modular architecture.
The evolution of power tools did not end with temples. The next step in the development of the scale and complexity of state projects was the planned construction of entire cities. This was a logical transition from erecting a *single monument* to creating an *entire environment for life, work, and administration*.
The thesis that large construction projects served as tools for state development, redistribution, and social integration is not based solely on interpreting the logic of pyramid building. Although we lack direct, written declarations from the Old Kingdom rulers about their economic goals (which is understandable, as they used the language of religion), later eras provide us with indisputable evidence that confirms this principle.
Situations hundreds, even thousands of years after the time of Cheops show that the mechanism of using monumental investments for state purposes was a constant element of pharaonic strategy. Importantly, from these later periods, we have hard evidence, such as inscriptions on stelae, which directly or indirectly reveal these pragmatic motivations.
The most famous and telling example is the Restoration Stela of Tutankhamun (New Kingdom, c. 1330 BCE). We all know this pharaoh thanks to the discovery of his intact tomb, but his actions after the religious revolution of Akhenaten shed fascinating light on the PaC logic.
Besides Tutankhamun, other examples also confirm this principle:
These examples, though distant in time from the 4th Dynasty, show a striking continuity of the principle: monumental construction, regardless of its form (pyramid, temple, city), was a key tool in the hands of the pharaohs for achieving state goals. Religion provided the ideological legitimization, but the driving force was the pragmatic need to manage the economy, integrate society, and strengthen power.
Moreover, this principle seems timeless. Construction, whether in ancient Egypt or in the modern world, remains one of the main engines of the economy, generating employment, stimulating related industries, and serving as a tool of state policy. The evidence from later Egyptian eras only confirms that the pharaohs understood this relationship long before us.
Here we come to the fundamental difference that applies to all new forms of construction—rock-cut temples, modular temples, and planned cities.
In contrast to the sealed pyramids, which became dead, inaccessible monuments after completion, temples and cities "lived." They were centers of cult, administration, education, and social life, accessible to people daily or during festivals. Thus, they fulfilled a crucial social function even after construction was finished, continuously upholding the authority of the state and its structures.
It is important to emphasize that the evolution of tools did not mean a change in the method of their justification. Regardless of whether the pharaoh was erecting a pyramid, carving a temple in rock, adding a pylon at Karnak, or founding a new city, religion always remained the primary source of legitimization for these actions. It was the "safe approach."
The pharaoh, as a divine ruler, had the duty to maintain *Maat*—cosmic order. Building in honor of the gods (or for one`s own cult) was seen as fulfilling this duty. The pharaoh "had to" build to ensure the gods` favor, not just "wanted to." This narrative ensured social acceptance for the enormous effort and cost.
Religion was thus the unchanging "operating system" on which all pragmatic state programs ran. We can also use the "oxygen metaphor": although oxygen does not make up the majority of the atmosphere (it`s only about 21%), life is impossible without it. Similarly here—economics and politics may have been the main engine, but without the "oxygen" of religious legitimization, the entire project would never have gained social acceptance or the energy for its realization.
One can even notice that the further from the era of the great pyramids, the more unequivocally religious the *official* character of the monumental structures became. Temples were directly "homes of the gods," and cities were often centers of new cults. The separation of the monumental building`s function from the hidden tombs in the Valley of the Kings further reinforced the impression that the visible structures served the current needs of the state, sanctified by religion.
The evolution from the monolithic pyramid, through rock-cut and modular temples, to planned cities, shows a logical progression in the development of the tools of power. It reveals the pharaohs not just as mystics focused on the afterlife, but above all as strategists, managers, and builders of statehood.
The key conclusion is therefore as follows: the cessation of building great pyramids was not a sign of crisis, but of strategic maturity. It happened not because the tool failed, but because its mission was completed.
The pharaohs of the 4th Dynasty were the "builders of the foundations of statehood." They used a rigid but powerful tool (the pyramid) to integrate the country. Their successors were already the "stewards and managers of a mature empire." They switched to flexible tools (temples and cities) that allowed them to flexibly manage resources, sustain the economy, and uphold their authority in a stable, wealthier society.
The tool of power evolved along with the society it had helped to build.
Here are answers to some of the most common questions about this theory.
Answer: The smaller pyramids are not a sign of failure, but of optimization. The goal of the PaC model was not to build the biggest monument possible, but to keep the state-building "machine" (of labor and redistribution) running. After the massive "integration shock" of Cheops`s pyramid, his successors could achieve the same socio-economic effect (maintaining the system, employing cadres) with a smaller, less risky, and less resource-intensive project. It`s a sign of a state becoming more efficient, not weaker.
Answer: Because in the initial phase, the young state needed a radical, unifying "shock". A massive, singular, multi-generational goal (the Great Pyramid) was the perfect tool to force integration, build an administration from scratch, and unite Upper and Lower Egypt in a single effort. A smaller, flexible temple project might not have had the same powerful, nation-building gravity. The high-risk, high-reward pyramid was the right tool for that specific "start-up" phase of the state.
Answer: The primary mission of integration and stabilization. The PaC theory posits that the great pyramids were built to solve the "integration crisis" of a newly unified Egypt. After decades of this shared project, the state was no longer a fragile union; it was a stable, integrated empire with a functioning administration, a unified culture, and a wealthy, established society. The tool (the pyramid) had successfully solved the problem it was built for. Therefore, it could be retired and replaced by tools designed for a new problem: not *building* a state, but *maintaining* one.
Answer: Yes, but much later, at the end of the Old Kingdom (around 2200 BCE), due to a severe climate crisis (a global drought) that the system couldn`t handle. This doesn`t contradict the theory. It suggests the PaC system was highly successful for centuries *under normal conditions*, but even it couldn`t withstand a catastrophic environmental collapse that shut down its primary "fuel": agricultural surplus.
My theory and the evidence I have gathered have been published in the form of a book, articles, and a documentary film. Below is an interactive list of all works – click on a title you are interested in to see details, links, and even the full content.
A detailed elaboration of the socio-economic theory, enriched with examples and previously unpublished materials.
The book has received international acclaim and is available in four languages: English, Spanish, German, and French.
View or buy on AmazonFollowing a rigorous editorial review, this article was published in the premium section of `Ancient Origins,` presenting the theory to a wide audience.
Read the article on Ancient OriginsA documentary film inspired by the theory, visualizing its key concepts.
Watch directly on YouTubeBelow are links to the open science repository ZENODO, where all key texts of the theory are archived.
1. The Main Theory (Why they were built):
The Great Pyramids of Egypt – Tombs or Primarily a Socio-Economic Development Project?
View publication in ZENODO2. The Continuation of the Theory (Why they stopped):
Why Did Ancient Egypt Stop Building Great Pyramids – The Evolution of a Tool of Power and Economy
This is the core essay that this entire webpage is based on, explaining the evolution from pyramids to temples and cities.
View publication in ZENODO3. Supporting Evidence:
30 Pieces of Evidence Supporting Jacek Krzysztoń`s Theory...
View publication in ZENODO4. Resilience Test (Anticipating Criticism):
The Resilience of Jacek Krzysztoń`s Theory... An Answer to 10 Key Doubts
View publication in ZENODO
Jacek Krzysztoń is an economist, entrepreneur, author of books on business and real estate, and an independent researcher of ancient history. His interest in Egypt, combined with many years of experience in managing large-scale projects and analyzing economic systems, led him to formulate a new interpretation of the purpose behind the greatest megaprojects in history — in particular the great pyramids — as well as the reasons why such projects suddenly stopped.
He is the author of the book “Egyptian Pyramids: Big Tombs or Big Business?”, in which he develops this thesis in detail. His analyses are published as open scientific preprints with DOIs (including on the Zenodo platform) and are made available to the academic community through Academia.edu. These works are indexed in international academic discovery services used by universities — including BASE (the Bielefeld Academic Search Engine) and the Library & Information Center of the University of Crete, whose catalog is consulted by researchers from hundreds of institutions. Krzysztoń`s conclusions have also been presented as a popular science article on the international portal Ancient Origins and have inspired the documentary film “The Pyramids – Tools of Power.”
As an independent researcher, he argues that the pyramids and other monumental structures can be understood not only as religious symbols, but as state instruments for organizing labor, redistributing resources, and maintaining social order. He refers to this perspective as the “Process as the Goal” (PaC) model.